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As a result of advances in mobile technology, new services which benefit from the ubiquity of these 
devices are appearing. Some of these services require the identification of the subject since they may 
access private user information. In this paper, we propose to identify each user by drawing his/her 
handwritten signature in the air (in-air signature). In order to assess the feasibility of an in-air signature 
as a biometric feature, we have analysed the performance of several well-known pattern recognition 
techniques—Hidden Markov Models, Bayes classifiers and dynamic time warping—to cope with this 
problem. Each technique has been tested in the identification of the signatures of 96 individuals. 
Furthermore, the robustness of each method against spoofing attacks has also been analysed using six 
impostors who attempted to emulate every signature. The best results in both experiments have been 
reached by using a technique based on dynamic time warping which carries out the recognition by 
calculating distances to an average template extracted from several training instances. Finally, a 
permanence analysis has been carried out in order to assess the stability of in-air signature over time. 
1. Introduction 
Nowadays, with the advent of smartphones, the original 
purpose of the mobile phone has been extended to provide many 
different applications. Nevertheless, this intensive use of mobile 
devices usually involves the handling of private information 
whose access must be restricted to an authorized user. In addition 
to some typical actions such as starting up the device, phoning 
reserved numbers or reading mail, other new electronic services 
also require user authentication. For instance, e-commerce, which 
may take advantage of the mobility provided by these devices, 
needs to authenticate the user when carrying out electronic 
transactions [1]. Smartphones have also been proposed to imple-
ment a remote control to activate/deactivate the burglar alarm of 
our homes [2] therefore in this case the user authentication 
becomes crucial in order to prevent potential intruders. Even 
though, in places with a low population density, the mobile phone 
has also been considered for electronic voting [3] to avoid the 
voters having to visit the polling station which can be far from 
their houses, so they must also be identified. 
In most of these applications, user authentication is carried out 
by means of a pin code or a password which must be remembered 
by the user. Nevertheless, in the field of biometrics, this problem 
is approached by obtaining some features for each individual, 
which identify him/her unequivocally. Biometric techniques are 
usually divided into two groups depending on the characteristic 
used to identify a person, namely physical and behavioural [4]. 
Physical biometric techniques are based on a physical character-
istic preserved in time that a user owns (iris [5], fingerprint [6], 
hand geometry [7], face [8]) whereas behavioural techniques are 
related to something that the user is able to repeat in an unique 
manner (handwriting signature [9], keystroke dynamics [10], gait 
[11]). In this article, we propose a biometric technique in which a 
person is authenticated by making his/her handwritten signature 
in the air (in-air signature) while holding a mobile phone. This 
biometric technique may be considered not only as a behavioural 
technique but also as a physical one, since the writing of the 
signature in the space depends on some physical characteristics of 
the person (length of the arm, size of the hand holding the device, 
capability of turning the wrist) [12,13]. 
In order to capture the movement of the in-air signature, the 
mobile phone must include a movement sensor. However, this is 
not a problem since leading mobile phones manufacturers are 
marketing phones incorporating a 3D accelerometer at a very fast 
rate. It is expected that in several years, most mobile phones will 
integrate an accelerometer making this proposed biometric tech-
nique accessible for most of the population. For example, Apple 
sold more than 4 million ¡Phone mobiles, embedding an accel-
erometer, just in the first three months of 2009 [14]. 
Although, there are, to our knowledge, only a few previous 
works proposing in-air signature as a biometric technique 
[12,15,13,16] (see Section 2), this problem shares some simila-
rities to other well-studied problems such as gesture and dynamic 
handwritten signature recognition. In contrast to our problem, 
gesture recognition aims to classify some gestures performed by 
different people to identify the gesture not the person. Nowadays, 
as a result of the high acceptability of interfaces incorporating an 
accelerometer, there are many previous works on this topic based 
on this sensor [17]. In-air signature recognition is also similar to 
dynamic handwritten signature [18] since both methods repre-
sent the signatures by means of temporal signals with spatial 
information. Nevertheless, in our case the movement is performed 
in the air instead of on a surface, so it will be much harder for an 
impostor to copy the 3-D gesture since there are no explicit 
references of the space where the gesture is performed [19]. 
In spite of these differences, we consider that the pattern 
recognition techniques applied to both branches may also be 
appropriate to solve our problem. This is the case of hidden 
Markov models (HMMs) and dynamic time warping (DTW) which 
have been extensively used in these fields obtaining excellent 
results [20,16]. On the other hand, another commonly used 
technique consists of the extraction of some global signal features 
and generating a classifier based on them [21]. Thus, in this 
article, we have tested all of these pattern recognition techniques 
in order to decide which is the most suitable one to solve our 
problem. 
To evaluate the feasibility of in-air signature as a biometric 
technique and the performance of the different classifiers, we 
have conducted an experiment in which several subjects per-
formed their own signatures in the air. In addition to this 
experiment, several imitators have attempted to forge previously 
collected signatures in order to assess to what extent the 
technique is robust against spoofing attacks. Finally, because in-
air signature is a behavioural biometric technique, we have also 
analysed the stability of in-air signatures over time using the 
technique which provided the best results. The results for these 
three experiments will be presented throughout this paper. 
The rest of this paper is divided into eight sections. The second 
section presents the results obtained in previous works in this 
field. Then, in Section 3, we describe the problem studied in this 
paper and the evaluation protocol. After that, we explain how all 
the experiments were conducted and how the signal was cap-
tured and normalized, the fifth section describes the application 
of the different techniques—HMM, Bayes classifiers and DTW—to 
solve our problem. Afterwards, the results obtained by previous 
techniques are compared and, in Section 7, we perform the 
permanence analysis of this biometric feature. Finally, the last 
section concludes the feasibility of this approach and establishes 
the most appropriate techniques. 
2. Previous works 
As we explained before, there are, to our knowledge, only a 
few previous works proposing in-air signature as a biometric 
technique [12,15,13,16]. Nevertheless, in these works, the ana-
lysed subjects did not use their own handwritten signature but 
some gestures which were usually less complex than their hand-
written signatures. Most of these works [12,15,13] used prede-
fined gestures so the authentication was carried out by measuring 
the differences among the performances of the same gesture by 
several individuals. On the other hand, the experiment presented 
in [16] may be considered closer to our approach as the gestures 
are different among them. Each gesture was chosen by each 
subject who participated in the experiments. 
In these previous works, two different pattern recognition 
approaches have been selected to generate the classifiers, which 
make the authentication of the individuals possible. 
The first approach consists of extracting some global features 
from the acceleration signal like the average or the curvature 
moments and then training a specific classifier for each individual 
based on them [12,15]. However, these works are preliminary 
studies so we consider their results as rather non-conclusive. On 
the one hand, the article [15] does not provide results on their 
accuracy since it is only a feasibility study. On the other hand, the 
authors of [12] reached over 95% recognition rate when discrimi-
nating between individuals but only 10 subjects participated in 
the experiment. 
Other works [13,16] have used a template matching approach 
which carries out the classification by calculating the distances 
between the given gesture and the template corresponding to 
each subject. Before calculating these distances, both works use 
an algorithm based on dynamic programming to align the 
compared gestures in order to deal with the time variability 
usually present in these signals. 
In more detail, the authors of [13] carried out an experiment in 
which 12 subjects drew a pentagram several times in the air 
during 6 weeks. Their algorithm obtained an equal error rate 
(EER) of 14.7% when attempting to discriminate between indivi-
duals in basis to the different ways of making the same gesture. 
This algorithm compared the similarity of the given gesture to the 
first gesture, which was considered as a template. The authors 
realised that the reason for this high rate was that the drawing of 
the pentagram for each subject had slightly changed over the 
period. Therefore, they proposed an algorithm to update this 
initial template achieving an EER of 4%. 
In article [16], the authors conducted an experiment over 10 
subjects in which each subject chose his/her own gesture. This 
work reached an EER of 3% by using dynamic time warping to 
distinguish the gestures of different individuals. However, the 
authors also carried out an experiment consisting of a spoofing 
attack in which the rate increased to 10%. Therefore, this result 
shows that this technique may be weak against this type of 
attack. Finally, the authors of this paper carried out a survey on 
the reasons for choosing the gestures concluding that the main 
ones were the uniqueness of the gesture and ease of remember-
ing. Hence this survey confirmed our decision of using the hand-
written signature in the air since it is considered unique and the 
subjects get used to performing it frequently. 
3. Problem statement 
The problem presented in this paper consists of authenticating 
a user by writing his/her signature in the air using a phone which 
incorporates an accelerometer. As opposed to identification pro-
blems in which a given instance is evaluated on the models of 
different subjects to identify the owner of the analysed signature, 
in our problem the given instance is only compared to a model of 
the signature of the genuine user in order to verify his/her 
identity. Depending on the result of this verification, the mobile 
system allows or denies access to the user. 
In order to extract the pattern of a user's signature, he/she 
must enrol in the system by writing his/her signature several 
times. When comparing a given instance to the user's model, the 
verification system will produce a score which reflects the 
similarity between the instance and the pattern. Therefore, to 
accept or reject a specific signature, we must define a threshold 
for this score. If the score produced for an analysed signature is 
higher than the fixed threshold then this signature is accepted as 
belonging to the subject, otherwise it is rejected. 
In the evaluation of the performance of this identity verifier 
we must consider two types of error: either the genuine user 
attempts to access the mobile system but he/she is rejected 
(false rejection rate (FRR)) or an impostor is able to enter the 
system by performing a gesture similar to that of the genuine user 
(false acceptance rate (FAR)). The first type of error may be 
evaluated by checking the system with some testing samples 
different from the ones used during the enrolment phase. For the 
second type of error, we have proposed two different attacks. 
First, a zero-effort impostor attack which measures the similarity 
between signatures of different subjects by attempting to access 
the system with the signature of another subject. Second, a 
spoofing attack is carried out to evaluate the security of the 
system against impostor's attacks. In this active attack, the 
impostor attempts to emulate the signature of the user after 
seeing his/her performing the signature. 
Therefore, for both attacks we must find the threshold which 
provides the best trade-off between FAR and FRR. Some applica-
tions may prefer a low FAR instead of a low FRR or vice versa, but 
in this paper we assume that the best trade-off is obtained when 
FAR and FRR reach the same value which is called equal error rate 
(EER). The EER for a zero-effort impostor attack and the EER for 
active impostor attack will be used throughout this paper to 
evaluate the different pattern recognition techniques. Receiver 
operating characteristic (ROC) curves will also be presented for 
each technique in order to show the relationship between FAR 
and FRR because they are commonly used in the evaluation of 
pattern recognition techniques. Furthermore, in this ROC curve 
we have plotted a diagonal line which represents the points in 
which FAR and FRR are equal, so the points where the ROC curve 
cross this line will represent the EER. 
Finally, after deciding the most appropriate technique, we 
have also carried out a permanence analysis to assess the stability 
of this biometric feature over time. Because an in-air signature is 
a behavioural characteristic, it may suffer slight variations 
between performances caused by a different way of holding the 
phone, changes in clothing, etc. 
4. Experimental setup 
For the evaluation of the pattern recognition techniques, we 
have captured the in-air signature of 96 subjects (68 males and 
28 females) with an age ranging from 18 to 60 years old. They 
were asked to repeat their handwritten signature in the air eight 
times using a device with an embedded accelerometer. During 
this acquisition process, all of the individuals were recorded 
on video while performing the signature. Therefore, we have 
captured 768 genuine signatures (96 subjects x 8 repetitions). 
However, as a result of some technical problems a 1.95% of 
the available gestures were corrupted, so we removed these 
erroneous signatures from our database in order to maintain its 
validity (753 valid instances). 
The active impostor attack has been carried out by six different 
individuals (four males and two females, with an age ranging 
from 22 to 29 years old). Each impostor attempted to emulate the 
signature of all the subjects of the database seven times. These 
attempts were divided into two sessions: one simulating that the 
impostor saw the signature by chance and other simulating that 
the impostor recorded a video with the signature and studied it 
carefully. In the former session, the impostor only watched the 
recorded signature twice and then attempted to repeat the 
signature three times. In the latter session, the impostor could 
watch the recorded signature as many times as he wanted and 
then repeat the signature four times. Furthermore, in order to 
help the impostors to reproduce the signature, they were 
informed of the name of the individuals, as in most cases, it 
appears on the signature. Nevertheless, in the results shown in 
this article we do not distinguish between both results since the 
differences were minimal. Therefore, for each impostor, we will 
have 672 (96 subjects x 7 attempts) forgeries of the signatures. 
For the permanence analysis, the temporal evolution of a 
subset of the in-air signatures from the first experiment has been 
studied. Specifically, eight subjects have repeated their signature 
in 20 separated sessions over a period of approximately two 
months. In each session, the subject repeated his/her signature 
five times. The time interval between consecutive sessions was 
about five days and each session was scheduled at a different 
time. Furthermore, there were no restrictions on the clothing of 
the subjects. 
4.1. Data capturing 
All signatures have been captured using the mobile device 
"¡Phone" from Apple Inc., which incorporates a tri-axial acceler-
ometer. The three acceleration signals (Ax,Ay,Az) are measured in 
gravity units (g) in the range of [-2.3g, 2.3g]. This vector is 
captured with a sampling rate of 100 Hz, which is fast enough for 
our purpose since the maximum frequency of hand gestures is 
about 10 Hz [22]. The segmentation of the signatures was 
performed manually. Before the signature was written, the sub-
ject pushed a button on the screen and he/she pushed this button 
again at the end of the signature. The average length of the in-air 
gestures performed by all individuals was 4.17 s + 1.2 with a 
maximum duration of 6 s. Fig. 1 shows an example of the 
acceleration signals captured during the performance of an 
in-air signature. 
4.2. Preprocessing 
Because the signatures may be performed at different speeds, 
the magnitude of the acceleration signals (A), which represent the 
signatures, may vary considerably. Furthermore, slight changes in 
the orientation of the sensor may make the contribution of the 
gravity modify the offset of the signal. For these reasons, we have 
normalized the signals (AN) corresponding to each signature in 
order to facilitate their comparison. For each axis (x, y, z), we have 
removed the offset (average (fi)) of the signal and we have 
normalized its amplitude by dividing the signal by its standard 
deviation (er) during the signature: 
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Nevertheless, we have not performed normalization on the 
time dimension since the pattern recognition techniques analysed 
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Fig. 1. Example of the acceleration signals of an in-air signature. 
features of the data which should be independent of an overall 
rescaling of the time dimension. On the other hand, DTW is a 
well-known technique given its ability to align temporal signals. 
In the case of HMM, some previous works in gesture recognition 
have proposed to rescale the tempo of the gesture [20] whereas 
other works did not perform any type of time normalization [27]. 
Furthermore, the length of in-air signatures captured in our 
experiment ranges from 1 to 6 s depending on the subject so 
we consider that this duration is also a characteristic feature of 
user's signature. 
5. Analysed pattern recognition techniques 
In order to obtain comparable results for all the following 
analysed techniques, we have defined some constraints which all 
methods must follow. First, the training set necessary to learn the 
model of each signature will be made up of five training instances, 
which will be chosen randomly from among the eight available 
ones. Because of this random selection of the training instances, 
all tests carried out in this paper will be repeated 10 times with 
different training sets to obtain results independent of the chosen 
training instances. Therefore, the results presented in this paper 
will be referred to the average result of these 10 repetitions. 
5.2. Hidden Markov models 
Hidden Markov model (HMM) is a well-known technique as a 
result of its ability to model dynamic systems and to deal with 
noisy data. Initially, HMMs were applied extensively to speech 
recognition [23], obtaining admirable results. This success made 
their use widespread in other fields like handwritten character 
recognition [24] or even activity recognition [25]. Nowadays, 
HMM may be considered the state-of-art technique in gesture 
recognition from acceleration data [20,26-28]. 
HMM consists of an underlying Markov process whose state 
cannot be directly observed. This hidden state can only be 
inferred from an output variable that is influenced by this state. 
There are two different kinds of HMM related to the type of this 
observable output: discrete and continuous HMMs. 
The outputs of discrete HMMs can only take values in a 
discrete alphabet. Where the pattern to model has continuous 
outputs, such as the acceleration values of in-air signatures, the 
output must be discretized. Some works in gesture recognition 
have used discrete HMMs by partitioning the output space with 
fe-means algorithm [26] or dividing this space into 3D cells of 
equal volume [28]. However, in this work, we decided to use 
continuous HMM in order to avoid this discretization process, 
which sometimes supposes a great loss of signal information. 
In contrast to discrete HMMs, the outputs of continuous HMMs 
can represent any n-dimensional vector with real values, since the 
output of each state is defined by means of a probability density 
function on a n-dimensional space. This output function may be 
modelled with only one Gaussian distribution as in Gaussian HMM 
(GHMM) or by the combination of several Gaussian functions as in 
the case of mixtures of Gaussian HMM (MGHMM). Although, most 
previous works have used GHMM obtaining high recognition rates 
[20,27], in this paper we have also tested MGHMM since they can 
provide more complex distributions. Notice that GHMM may be 
considered as a MGHMM with only one component. 
In addition to the type of the output, other HMM parameters 
must be fixed in advance before training the models: the HMM 
architecture and the number of states. The HMM architecture 
refers to the way of connecting the different states and, usually, 
two architectures are proposed: left-right and ergodic. In left-right 
architecture, there are only connections between consecutive 
states and the process can only move forward in these states. On 
the one hand, this architecture has been successfully used in 
gesture recognition [27] since it is suitable for temporal signals. 
On the other hand, ergodic architecture allows any state to be 
connected to other state without any restriction. Therefore, this 
provides a powerful model, which is also well suited to gesture 
recognition [26] since it can express any relation between states. 
As regards the number of states, previous works have proposed a 
wide range of values: 5 in [26], 10 in [27] or 12 in [20]. However, 
the gestures used in these works usually have a duration of less 
than a second whereas our in-air signatures can take up to 6 s. For 
this reason, we must consider the inclusion of a greater number of 
states as well as in other works in which MGHMM was applied to 
recognize handwritten signatures [29]. 
Because there were no unified criteria about the type of 
architecture and the number of states and mixtures used for the 
outputs, we have carried out several tests to decide which are the 
best parameters for our application. After some initial analyses, 
we established that the architecture of the HMM will be ergodic 
(Fig. 2 details this chosen architecture but only for four states) 
since it obtained higher recognition rates than left-right one. In 
order to show how the number of states and mixtures of outputs 
affects the performance of HMM in our problem, in Fig. 3 we have 
represented the average EERs of a zero-effort impostor attack 
obtained for different configurations. In particular, we have tested 
GHMMs and MGHMMs with mixtures of two and three Gaussian 
functions and with a number of states ranging from 10 to 70. The 
lowest EER has been obtained for the configuration with 60 states 
and three mixtures, so we have selected this configuration for the 
following experiments. Furthermore, it can be seen that the 
inclusion of additional states does not improve the results. 
The training stage consists of modelling an MGHMM for the 
in-air signature of each subject. Each MGHMM is learned with 
Fig. 2. Example of ergodic GMHMM with four states. 
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different instances of the signature by means of an expectation-
maximization algorithm. In this paper, this parameter estimator 
has been iterated 20 times for every trained model using these 
initial parameters: random transition probabilities and a random 
output distribution for each state. During the classification process, 
the signature of each subject is evaluated over the MGHMMs of all 
subjects. Using the forward algorithm, the probability of each 
MGHMM to produce this particular signature is computed. There-
fore, in this case, the threshold to determine acceptance or 
rejection of a signature will be fixed on this probability. 
In Fig. 4, we have represented the ROC curves obtained by 
using HMMs with the chosen configuration and learned with five 
training instances. The solid line shows the results corresponding 
to the zero-effort impostor attack whereas the dotted line shows 
the results of the active impostor attack. Although both curves 
have a similar shape, the ROC curve of the zero-effort attack is 
above the other ROC curve since the signatures of different 
subjects are more separable than the signatures from their 
forgeries. As we explained before, the points where the diagonal 
line crosses the ROC curves represent the EER. These points have 
been obtained by placing an overall threshold over the log-
likelihood measure produced by each HMM when evaluating a 
given signature. This measure represents to what extent a 
signature fits a given HMM and it ranges from 0 when it fits 
perfectly to -oo when the signature is completely different to the 
model. In our case, the threshold values to obtain the EER were 
-964 for zero-effort attack and - 8 5 0 for impostor attack which 
means that it is necessary to be less permissive in order to reject 
the more impostor signatures. 
Previous analysis was carried out by using five training 
instances, however, in a practical application this will suppose 
that the subject should repeat his/her signature five times to enrol 
in the system for the first time. This initial task may be considered 
annoying for the user, so we have analysed whether this number 
of training instances may be decreased without reducing con-
siderably the performance. Fig. 5 shows the average EERs for both 
attacks when using training sets with a size ranging from 1 to 5 
instances. Depending on the needs of the application, the user could 
reduce the number of enrolment instances at the expense of 
increasing the EER 
5.2. Statistical classifier 
In this approach, every signature is described using a set of D 
features that describe some global characteristics of the signature. 
These D features can be represented in a space of D dimensions; 
therefore, each signature can be viewed as a point in this feature 
space. The goal of a classifier is to obtain the decision boundaries 
on the feature space from several training instances, so that they 
allow a given signature to be assigned to the correct class (subject). 
In particular, for this paper, we have used a Bayesian classifier, 
which models the class of each signature by means of a multi-
variate normal density function. In other papers [21] the authors 
propose to use support vector machines instead of Bayesian ones 
since this method usually achieves higher recognition rates. Never-
theless, this method requires signatures from other subjects to 
generate every classifier, whereas Bayesian classifiers can be 
trained without them. In our case, this is a marked limitation since 
this system will be developed in a mobile device and therefore the 
signatures of other users will be not available. 
The feature selection is critical to obtain high recognition rates. 
Statistical features, e.g., mean, standard deviation and the like, are 
usually used in time series as they describe the global behaviour 
of the pattern [30]. Features based on frequency like the coeffi-
cients of the discrete Fourier transform (DFT) or the discrete 
time wavelet transform provide information about the different 
frequencies present in the pattern [31]. Some works have 
also proposed more complex features like the frequency 
domain-entropy [30] or Doppler spectrum [32]. In this article, 
we have used the following features, which were proposed by the 
author of [21] for gesture recognition using a 3D accelerometer 
(each feature has been calculated for each axis except for the 
correlation which is calculated for every pair of axis): 
• Mean ¡i: Average of acceleration values during the signature 
(/ix, fiy and fiz). 
• Standard deviation a: Standard deviation of acceleration 
values during the signature (erx, ery and erz). 
• Correlation y: Correlation between the acceleration signals of 
different axis (y^, yyz and yxz). 
• Entropy 5: Normalized information entropy of the DFT com-
ponent magnitudes as explained in [21] (<5X, Sy and <5Z). 
• Energy e: Sum of all the squared DFT component magnitudes 
except the DC component of the signal because it has been 
considered as the independent feature ¡i. 
In order to analyse the best features for discriminating between 
different signatures, we have generated several classifiers trained 
with different sets of features. Furthermore, following the indica-
tions of the authors of [21 ], we have divided the signal into several 
frames of equal length to calculate these features individually for 
each frame. This division allows the number of features to be 
multiplied by the number of frames, which may help the discri-
mination between subjects. In particular for this article, we have 
analysed the performance when dividing the signal into 1, 2 and 
3 frames. Fig. 6 shows the average EER in a zero-effort impostor 
attack obtained for the classifiers trained with different combina-
tions of features and number of frames. It can be seen that the best 
rates are obtained for feature sets which combine the average {¡i), 
the standard deviation (er) and the correlation (y). On the other 
hand, the inclusion of S and e features only decreases the 
performance of the classifier. As regards the number of frames, 
the figure shows that the division into three frames is only 
worthwhile when the feature set contains a few number of 
features, however, in other cases it does not improve the results. 
We have chosen the feature set that provides the lowest EER which 
is made up of the average ¡i, the standard deviation a and the 
correlation y and each sample is divided into three frames. Hence, 
every signature will be represented with 27 features (three frames x 
three features x three axis). 
The ROC curves represented in Fig. 7 show the different 
behaviours of the classifiers for both attacks. For the zero-effort 
impostor attack, the classifier produces a high recognition rate for 
their own signatures and a low acceptance rate for the signatures 
of other users. This means that the Bayesian classifier generated 
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with the chosen features allow separating the signatures of 
different subjects. However, the ROC curve for the active impostor 
attack shows a high acceptance rate for genuine signatures and 
their forgeries. Therefore, this classifier is not able to discriminate 
between a genuine signature and a forged one. This fact can be 
also observed in the threshold values which produce the EERs. In 
the zero-effort attack, the threshold value is almost 0 which 
makes it easy to accept any signature of the same subject, 
whereas in the impostor attack this value is close to 1 in order 
to reject those signatures performed by an impostor. 
Finally, the performance analysis of Bayesian classifiers when 
using training sets of different sizes is shown in Fig. 8. This 
analysis has not been carried out for training sets with only one 
instance as the extraction of the covariances of the multivariate 
Gaussian distributions requires at least two training instances. In 
this figure, the EER for zero-effort impostor attack decreases 
smoothly as the number of training instances increases. For 
instance, the rate obtained for two training instances is 3.2% 
and for five training instances is 1.8%. Therefore, this smooth 
variation makes it possible to fix the enrolment time depending 
on the needs of the application. Nevertheless, this figure also 
shows that the EER for the active impostor attack remains 
stable (at about 14%) in spite of generating the classifiers with 
an increasing number of training instances. 
5.3. Dynamic time warping 
Template matching approaches are based on the fact that 
signals belonging to the same pattern have a similar shape. The 
similarity between two different signals is measured with a 
determined distance, which is calculated throughout the exten-
sion of the signals. Most common distances, as Euclidean distance, 
can only compare sequences that have the same length. However, 
in the real world, two signals belonging to the same temporal 
pattern can present variability not only in their amplitude, but 
also in their duration or speed. Moreover, this variability can be 
different in several parts of the signal which might not be 
corrected with an overall rescaling of the sequences. 
DTW has been widely used in many fields such as speech 
recognition [33], and even gesture recognition [34]. In these 
fields, this technique has shown a great ability to calculate the 
similarity between signals that present variability in the time 
axis. When comparing two signals, this method compresses and 
expands the time scale of both signals in order to align them and 
to minimize the total distance. Therefore, because of the nature of 
the acceleration signals of the captured signatures, this distance 
seems appropriate to the task at hand. Similar distances based on 
DTW has been proposed to deal with acceleration signals as the 
derivative DTW (DDTW) [35], which aligns the signals in basis to 
the estimated derivative instead of the signal itself. However, we 
have tested DDTW using the signatures of our database without 
obtaining any improvement, so we have used the classic DTW. 
In order to make the signal alignment, the DTW algorithm 
generates a matrix M with the accumulated costs of aligning the 
samples of two signals (A, B). Each element m¡j represents the 
accumulated cost of aligning subsequences of A and B from the 
beginning (A^, B^) to the elements A¡ and B¡. In our case, the cost of 
aligning to points A¡ and A¡ is the Euclidean distance between the 
3D acceleration vectors of these points. After that, the algorithm 
determines the path of this matrix which allows both signals to be 
aligning, thus producing the minimum cost. This path W is called 
the "warping path" and represents how both signals must be 
extended or compressed in order to be aligned. Hence, the distance 
between two signals will be the sum of each element cost of the 
chosen warping path. This distance will be divided by the length of 
the warping path W in order to make it independent of the length 
of the signals. An example of the DTW algorithm for two signatures 
is represented in Fig. 9 where matrix M is depicted with the 
accumulated costs and the warping path W using a white line. 
The normalized histograms represented in Fig. 10 show the 
distribution of the distances between signatures of the same 
subject, signatures of different subjects and their forgeries. The 
intersection of both distributions represents those signatures that 
may be misclassified. It can be seen that the intersection between 
the distributions of distances between the same signatures and 
the distances between different signatures is insignificant and 
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therefore signatures of different subjects are easily separable. 
Nevertheless, the distributions of distances between signatures of 
the same subject and their forgeries are overlapping, i.e. some 
forgeries are quite similar to the forged signatures. 
In contrast to previously analysed methods, the DTW has no 
learning phase since it only stores the training instances. During 
the testing stage, this approach measures the similarity between 
the given instance and the training ones. In the case that there are 
k training instances for each signature, the most typical method 
for the classification process is fe-nearest neighbour (fc-NN). 
However, this assumes carrying out k comparisons between the 
given instance and that of training. In this paper, we propose 
another method called "Average DTW" which requires only one 
comparison. This method, which is based on the work presented 
in [36], generates a template from the N training instances and 
then compares this template to the analysed instance. 
The first step of this algorithm is to calculate the DTW 
distances between all possible pairs of all training instances 1^
 N 
in order to decide which instance can be used as a reference. The 
reference instance IR will be the one that presents the smallest 
average distance to all the remaining instances. We suppose that 
IR is normalized and we normalize the remaining instances using 
their warping paths wk in respect to this reference instance. Each 
warping path wk indicates how to compress and expand the time 
scale of the instance Ik to minimize the distance with IR. Between 
every pair of consecutive elements wk and w{?+1 of the warping 
path w \ the DTW algorithm allows only three types of movement 
along the matrix M: horizontal, vertical and diagonal. Depending 
Table 1 
Pair-wise alignment criteria. 
Movement Action 
on these movements we have rescaled the instance Ik following 
the indications in Table 1. 
Compressing samples means joining them and this produces a 
loss in the original information. In order to minimize this loss, we 
combine these points by calculating their average. In the case of 
extending a sample, we must repeat the original value of the 
sample for the next samples. After rescaling all instances, for each 
instance we will obtain a normalized sequence which has the 
same length as the reference instance IR. At this point, we propose 
to extract the average template of these instances by calculating 
the average points for each time sample. An example of the 
template extraction from several training instances is shown in 
Fig. 11. 
Fig. 12 shows the evolution of EERs when increasing the 
number of training instances. The EERs for only one training 
instance (8.83% and 4.72%) correspond to the EERs obtained from 
the distributions depicted in Fig. 10 without any learning stage 
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Fig. 12. Performance of average DTW for training sets with different sizes. 
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and they have been represented only to show the improvements 
achieved by the learning method. The best rates (4.58% and 2.12%) 
are reached by using five training instances however, should we 
need to reduce the enrolment time, we can also consider using 
only three training instances since their results are also accep-
table (5.74% and 2.66%). 
Finally, aiming to show the relation between FAR and FRR, in 
Fig. 13 we have represented the ROC curves for both attacks 
obtained by using five training instances. The ROC curve corre-
sponding to the zero-effort impostor attack indicates that this 
technique produces an excellent classifier which provides high 
true positive rates and low false negative rates. On the other hand, 
the other ROC curve shows a decreasing accuracy of this techni-
que when discriminating between signatures and their forgeries 
in the active impostor attack. Nevertheless, this performance 
decreasing is more attenuated than for previously analysed 
techniques. In order to show the differences between zero-effort 
attack and impostor attack, we have calculated the threshold 
values which produce EERs for both attacks obtaining 1.39 and 
0.7, respectively. These values reflect that it is necessary to reduce 
the threshold by half to discriminate between signatures and 
forgeries. 
6. Comparison of methods 
In order to compare all the different methods, we have 
summarized the obtained results in Table 2. This table represents 
the EERs reached for each approach when using training sets of 
different sizes. 
As expected, in all methods, the results for discriminating 
between forgeries and genuine signatures are rather worse than 
the results for distinguishing between the signatures of different 
individuals. Specifically, this difference is extremely high in the 
case of Bayesian classifiers since this method obtains the lowest 
EER when discriminating between individuals but it also reaches 
the highest EER for an active impostor attack. For this reason, we 
consider that the Bayesian classifiers are suitable for solving this 
problem though they may be fruitful in other fields such as 
gesture recognition. 
In average, the best results are reached by the method based 
on DTW. For instance, the rates obtained by DTW without any 
kind of training are comparable to the rates obtained by HMM 
when using four training instances. However, the highest perfor-
mance is achieved by means of the use of the training stage 
(average DTW) as the results obtained by using two training 
instances are comparable to the results of HMM with a training 
set of five instances. 
As well as the analysis of recognition performance, we must 
also take into account the computational cost of each algorithm. 
All of the algorithms have been developed in Matlab from Math-
works Inc. and implemented on a computer with a Intel processor 
Duo T9400 and 4 GB of RAM. We have tested each algorithm with 
a signature sample with a length of 4.17 s which is the average 
length of all signatures. The execution time of DTW algorithm1 to 
calculate the distance between the template and this sample is 
about 0.030 s whereas obtaining the forward probability with the 
HMM algorithm2 took 0.042 s. The Bayesian classifier3 could not 
be evaluated since the Matlab function, which generates this 
classifier, includes both training and testing stage in the same 
code, so we could not obtain the duration of the testing stage 
separately. However, in our opinion, this algorithm should have 
the lowest computational cost since it does not iterate over the 
temporal signal. Therefore, we have concluded that the pattern 
recognition technique which provides the best accuracy/compu-
tation cost relationship is average DTW. 
7. Permanence analysis 
Behavioural biometric techniques such as in-air signature 
must face the problem of repeatability. In our case, this means 
that a user has to be able to repeat the gesture with little variance. 
For this reason, we have carried out this permanence analysis 
which assesses the variability of in-air signature in time. For this 
analysis, we have used average DTW because this pattern recog-
nition technique has provided the best performance in previous 
experiments. In this test, we generated a template for each 
signature using the five instances corresponding to the first day. 
Then, we calculated the distances between this template and the 
instances captured during the following days. 
In Fig. 14, we have divided the evolution of these distances 
into two different groups of subjects. In the lower figure we have 
represented the users who are able to repeat their signature 
accurately over time because we can see that their distances 
remain stable. On the other hand, the upper figure contains 
increasing distances which represent those users who gradually 
change the performance of their signatures with the passing of 
the time. Although this means that the repeatability of in-air 
signature depends on the user’s ability, we could deal with this 
variability by updating the template over time as the authors of 
[13] have proposed. 
8. Conclusion and future work 
In this work, we have shown the feasibility of using an in-air 
signature as a biometric technique for verification of identity. 
Although, the results are promising, this technique must be 
considered a weak biometric technique since the results are far 
from the results obtained by other well-known biometric techni-
ques such as iris [37] or palmar surface of the hand [38]. Never-
theless, these results are comparable to other behavioural 
biometric techniques such as on-line handwritten signature [39] 
or gait recognition [40]. Hence, this technique must be relegated 
1
 Implemented by Timothy Felty and available in http://www.mathworks. 
com/matlabcentral/fileexchange/6516-dynamic-time-warping. 
2
 Implemented by Kevin Murphy and available in http://www.cs.ubc.ca/ 
~ murphyk/Software/HMM/hmm.html. 
3
 Implemented by Mathworks Inc. 
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Table 2 
Average EERs for all studied methods using training sets of different sizes. 
Method 
HMM 
Bayes 
DTW 
Data 
Zero-effort 
Active impostor 
Zero-effort 
Active impostor 
Zero-effort 
Active impostor 
Number of training instances 
1 2 3 4 5 
12.05% 7 0.75 
14.15% 7 0.70 
N.A. 
N.A. 
4.72% 7 0 
8.83% 7 0 
7.98% 7 0.69 
10.17% 7 0.91 
3.21% 7 0.73 
13.29% 7 0.87 
2.99% 7 0.39 
6.62% 7 0.68 
6.43% 7 0.32 
8.34% 7 0.61 
2.28% 7 0.49 
13.93% 7 0.54 
2.66% 7 0.46 
5.74% 7 0.62 
5.45% 7 0.77 
7.47% 7 0.66 
1.98% 7 0.51 
14.07% 7 0.56 
2.38% 7 0.6 
5.29% 7 0.64 
3.93% 7 0.96 
5.96% 7 0.55 
1.81% 7 0.33 
14.09% 7 0.37 
2.12% 7 0.51 
4.58% 7 0.51 
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Fig. 14. Evolution in time of the distances between the initial template and daily 
captured instances. 
to non-critical security applications or be combined with other 
techniques to reach the necessary accuracy. 
After the comparison of different techniques for the recogni-
tion of in-air signatures, we can conclude that the most appro-
priate method to solve this problem is DTW. In particular, the 
‘‘average DTW’’ algorithm which extracts a template from differ-
ent training instances has obtained an EER of 2.12% when 
discriminating the signatures of several individuals. Furthermore, 
this technique has demonstrated its robustness against spoofing 
attacks since the EER only rose to 4.58% when six impostors 
attempted to forge the signatures after viewing recorded videos 
several times in which the individuals performed their in-air 
signatures. 
Although, the results obtained by other techniques are inferior 
to the ones obtained by DTW, we consider that these techniques 
may be combined in order to improve their results. For instance, 
the Bayesian classifier presents the lowest EER 1.81% when 
discriminating between signatures of different individuals so this 
ability could be used in a prior stage of other technique to reject 
the signatures of other individuals. Furthermore, this technique 
present a low computational cost, thus it supposes that the 
combined technique will need less computational power and 
therefore it could be implemented in a mobile platform. A further 
study of the benefits of this combination will be carried out in 
future works. 
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